Securites Law by Murdock, Charles W. & Murdock, Charles W.
Chicago-Kent Law Review
Volume 52
Issue 2 Seventh Circuit Review Article 9
October 1975
Securites Law
Charles W. Murdock
Charles W. Murdock
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Chicago-Kent Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please
contact dginsberg@kentlaw.iit.edu.
Recommended Citation
Charles W. Murdock & Charles W. Murdock, Securites Law , 52 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 380 (1975).
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview/vol52/iss2/9
SECURITIES LAW
CHARLES W. MURDOCK*
As had been observed,1 the Seventh Circuit has been one of the more
active circuits in the area of securities regulation and is responsible for
several of the leading decisions in the field.2 Once again, the Seventh
Circuit has handed down several decisions of interest to practitioners in the
area of securities regulation, particularly C.N.S. Enterprises, Inc. v. G. & G.
Enterprises, Inc.,3 relating to the circumstances under which a note is not a
security, and Northway, Inc. v. TSC Industries, Inc.,4 dealing with the test
for materiality with respect to a misleading proxy statement. However, this
year, of primary interest is not so much what the Seventh Circuit has done,
but rather what the Supreme Court has done to the Seventh Circuit. This
article will begin by reviewing two earlier decisions of the Seventh Circuit
and analyzing the recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court which
have reversed, explicitly or implicitly, these Seventh Circuit opinions.
THE Eason AND Blue Chip Stamps DECISIONS
In 1973, the Seventh Circuit decided Eason v. General Motors Accept-
ance Corp.5 and in 1974, the Supreme Court denied certiorari. 6 Eason
dealt specifically with the so-called "Birnbaum Rule ' 7 and explicitly held
that this rule was "not part of the law of this circuit."8  Moreover, Eason
was heralded as signaling the ultimate demise of Birnbaum.9
* Dean, Loyola School of Law (Chicago); formerly Professor of Law, Notre
Dame University; Visiting Professor of Law, University of California at Hastings; Spe-
cial Consultant to the Securities and Exchange Commission, summer, 1973; J.D., Loyola
School of Law (Chicago).
1. Horwich & Ruder, Securities Law, 50 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 362 (1973) [herein-
after cited as Horwich & Ruder]; Fishman, Securities Law, 51 Cm.-KErr L. REv. 549
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Fishman].
2. Horwich & Ruder, note 1 supra, at 362-63.
3. 508 F.2d 1354 (7th Cir. 1975).
4. 512 F.2d 324 (7th Cir. 1975).
5. 490 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1973).
6. 416 U.S. 960 (1974).
7. The Birnbaum rule was articulated by Judge Augustus Hand in Birnbaum v.
Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 464 (2d Cir. 1952) where he stated, in interpreting
rule lOb-5 promulgated pursuant to section 10b of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act,
that "that section was directed solely at that type of misrepresentation or fraudulent
practice usually associated with the sale or purchase of securities rather than at fraudu-
lent mismanagement of corporate affairs, and that [rlule X-10B-5 extended protection
only to the defrauded purchaser or seller."
8. 490 F.2d at 661.
9. Note, Dumping Birnbaum to Force Analysis of the Standing Requirement
Under Rule 10b-5, 6 LoY. U. Cm. L.J. 230 (1975); Note, Rule 10b-5: The Rejection
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Simply stated, the Birnbaum rule is a standing requirment which would
limit the scope of protection afforded by rule lOb-5,10 promulgated by the
Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) pursuant to section 10(b) of
the 1934 Securities and Exchange Act, 1 to those persons who are either
defrauded purchasers or defrauded sellers. Rule lOb-5 prohibits the use of
interstate instrumentalities to defraud someone "in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.' 12
It should be noted that the rule does not specifically require that the
plaintiff be a purchaser or seller of securities. Rather, the rule merely
requires that the persons be defrauded "in connection with" a purchase or
sale of securities. In the years since Birnbaum was enunciated, many
decisions have either distinguished or rejected the application of the rule.' 3
The courts, over the years, have encountered many situations in which a
person was injured in a transaction which "involved" or "touched"'14 the sale
of securities and where the plaintiff was neither, strictly speaking, a purchaser
or seller of securities.' 5  In some circumstances, the extension of the
application of rule lOb-5, to view it one way, or the circumvention of
Birnbaum, to look at it another way, was not a difficult step. For example,
it is clear that the rule protects the defrauded issuer of securities, even
though, strictly speaking, the issuer does not sell but rather engages in the
legally cognizable act of "issuing" the securities.' 6 The Supreme Court itself
of the Birnbaum Doctrine by Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp. and the Need
for a New Limitation on Damages, 1974 DUKE L.J. 610; Note, Seventh Circuit Repudi-
ates the Birnbaum Doctrine, 1974 U. ILL. L.F. 521.
10. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1975).
11. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970).
12. The complete text of rule 1Ob-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1975), is as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of
any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
13. See Note, Dumping Birnbaum to Force Analysis of the Standing Require-
ment Under Rule 10b-5, 6 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 230, 241-48 (1975).
14. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12-13 (1971).
15. See Note, DUMPING Birnbaum TO FORCE ANALYSIS OF THE STANDING REQUIRE-
MENT UNDER RULE lOb-5, 6 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 230 (1975).
16. Issuance is the act by which a corporation creates fractional, proprietary inter-
est in itself. It is interesting to note that this term is generally not defined. For ex-
ample, the 1933 Securities Act defines "issuer" as a person who issues or proposes to
issue any security, but it does not define issue. Similarly, the Uniform Commercial
Code [ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 26, § 8-201 (1) (1973).] defines "issuer" but again does not
define "issue". However, subparagraph (b) which defines an issuer to be a person who
"directly or indirectly creates fractional interests in his rights or property which frac-
tional interests are evidenced by securities" implicitly gives the definition of the process
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held that the recipient of new securities in a merger was in effect a seller of
securities. 17 It is with this background of "end-runs" that the Seventh
Circuit confronted the facts of Eason.
'In Eason, a corporate purchaser of a business issued 7,000 shares of its
stock to the defendant seller, obtained the assets of the business in question
and assumed the liabilities of the defendant seller. These liabilities were in
large measure -represented by notes from the defendant to General Motors
Acceptance Corporation, which provided the financing for the automobile
leasing business in question. Plaintiffs were shareholders of the corporate
purchaser and, in connection with the transaction, delivered a guarantee of
the notes assumed by the corporate purchaser to General Motors Acceptance
Corporation, which was also made a defendant in the action. The transac-
tion is depicted in Figure 1.
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The business failed and the corporate purchaser became insolvent and
defaulted on the notes. To forestall GMAC's suit on the guarantee, plaintiff
shareholders brought suit seeking recision of the notes on the ground that
both the seller of the business and GMAC were guilty of fraud in connection
with the initial sale of the business.
In order to sustain federal jurisdiction under rule 10b-5, three possible
courses of action were open to the court: (1) Plaintiffs' guarantees could
have been treated as securities, in which case the plaintiffs would have no
problem with standing under the Birnbaum rule since they would be the
of issuance. It should also be noted that the issuance of authorized but unissued shares is
a different process from the resale of treasury shares. See discussion with respect to §§
2.10 and 2.17 of the Illinois Business Corporation Act in ILLINOIS BusINESs CoRPoRA-
TION AcT ANNOTATED (Murdock ed. 1975).
17. SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 467 (1969).
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sellers or "issuers" of the securities; (2) plaintiffs could 'have been treated
as the indirect sellers of the securites issued by the corporation purchasing
defendant's business,' in effect, piercing the corporate veil; and (3) the
Birnbaum rule could have been rejected outright and another test applied
to determine whether plaintiff shareholders were among the class of persons
intended to be protected by Rule 1Ob-5. The Seventh Circuit, in probably
the clearest and most concise treatment of this problem to date, adopted
the third course of action.
According to the court, there were three aspects to the question of
plaintiffs' right to relief: Whether they had "standing"; whether they were
protected by the rule; and whether overriding considerations of policy de-
feated their claim. The standing aspect posed no great difficulty for the
court. It focused upon the "injury in fact" aspect of standing and satisfied
itself that the plaintiffs had a vital stake in the outcome of the contro-
versy in question, thereby meeting the standing requirement of the rule.
In point of fact, the Supreme Court has articulated a two-fold test for
standing, requiring both "injury in fact" and that the complainant is within
the zone of interest sought to be protected by the statute ior rule in
question.' 9 While the Seventh Circuit did not treat the second element in its
discussion of standing, it devoted a substantial part of its analysis to the
question of whether plaintiffs were within the category of persons to whom
protection was intended under rule lOb-5. There is obviously a direct
correlation between the "zone of interests" concept and the "persons protect-
ed" concept.
In the view of the Seventh Circuit, limiting the words "any person" in
the rule so as to exclude all those except purchasers or sellers would not
constitute a broad and flexible interpretation of the rule as mandated by the
United States Supreme Court in several prior decisions. 20 On the other
hand, stretching the definition of "purchaser" or "seller" to the extent done
in other decisions would constitute a lack of intellectual integrity. 2 ' The
18. This would be analogous to the approach taken in James v. Gerber Products
Co., 483 F.2d 944 (6th Cir. 1973), where the beneficiary of a trust, as the real party
in interest, was considered the seller and given standing to sue in a situation in which
the trust itself sold stock to the issuing corporation at a price substantially below the
fair market value.
19. Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S.
150 (1970).
20. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963); Tcherepnin
v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967); Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co.,
404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971); Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151
(1972).
21. 490 F.2d at 659. The characterization by Judge Stevens is certainly a support-
able one. See, e.g., A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967), where
the court held that a customer's order to his broker was a contract of purchase by the
customer, thereby making the broker a seller within the meaning of the Birnbaum rule
and giving him standing to sue under rule lOb-5 when the customer refused to pay for
the stock, having intended to pay for it only if the value of the stock increased by the
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court took as its charge a directive of the Supreme Court that form should be
disregarded for substance and the emphasis should be on economic reality.
22
The court focused upon the fact that the rule was designed for the
protection of the investors. 23 According to the court, plaintiff shareholders,
who executed the guarantee in question, were clearly investors. It was their
interest as stockholders in the purchasing corporation that induced them to
execute the guarantees in question. With respect to the supposedly fraudu-
lent transaction, namely, the sale of the business to the purchasing corpora-
tion and the assumption by it of the liabilities of defendant, they were
directly involved. It would appear that the fact situation in Eason was a
more appropriate context to uphold the applicability of rule 10b-5 than was
the fact situation in Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Casualty
Co.,24 where the Supreme Court upheld a rule 10b-5 claim and stated the
test that plaintiff must have suffered injuries as a result of deceptive
practices "touching its sale of securities as an investor."'25 In Bankers Life,
the fraud was not in the sale of the securities themselves, but resulted from
the subsequent misappropriation of the proceeds which was contemplated at
the time of the sale. Thus, Bankers Life was not a situation where the
corporation was defrauded into selling securities at a low price or in selling
securities which ought to have been retained; there was nothing wrong with
the sale itself. It was the sale coupled with the intention at the time of sale
to misappropriate proceeds that was wrongful. Thus, the best the Supreme
Court could do in upholding the lOb-5 action was to state that the fraud
"touched" the sale of the securities. If a rule 10b-5 cause of action is
appropriate under those circumstances, it would seem a fortiori to be all
the more appropriate when the fraud is unquestionably in connection with
the sale of the security and the sale transaction "touches" the plaintiffs as
direct participants in the transaction in question, though not in the capacity
of purchaser or seller. In the opinion of this writer, where there is a sale (or
purchase) and fraud in connection therewith, any person who is directly
affected thereby should have standing to sue under rule 10b-5.
The Seventh Circuit concluded its analysis in Eason with consideration
of the question whether the Birnbaum rule should nonetheless be adopted to
curtail the amount of litigation sweeping the federal courts and to promote
consistency among the circuits in the interpretation of the securities acts.
Neither argument was found pursuasive by the court. With respect to
time the payment was due. See also 2 BRoMBERO, SEcuxrris LAW FaAuD § 8.8 (1967),
where the author states that "the buyer-seller condition has been stretched by broad in-
terpretation to include almost any shareholder affected by a corporate transaction."
22. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298 (1946); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389
U.S. 332, 336 (1967). -
23. 490 F.2d at 659.
24. 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
25. Id. at 12-13.
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delimiting the amount of litigation premised upon violations of rule 10b-5,
the court was of the opinion that its "special class" approach, coupled with
the requirement of injury as a direct consequence of the violation, would
provide adequate constraint on the types of suits which may be brought.
With respect to the consistency question, the court opined that any consisten-
cy now existing is more apparent than real. Unfortunately, the court did
suggest that the way to obtain consistency was for the Supreme Court to
resolve the conflict among the circuits which, apparently, the Supreme Court
has done in its ill-conceived opinion in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores.26
In Blue Chip Stamps, the Supreme Court was confronted with a rather
unusual fact situation: an involuntary public offering. The corporation, as a
result of an antitrust decree, was required to offer a substantial block of
shares at, arguably, a very advantageous price to retailers who had used the
stamp service in the past but who were not then shareholders of the
company. Nine retailers owned about 90 percent of the stock and, accord-
ingly, it was not to their benefit to have the stock offered to others at a
favorable price. The plaintiffs were retailers to whom the stock was offered
but who declined to buy as a result of the "fraudulently" pessimistic
statements in the registration statement. This then was the converse of the
situation with which the courts are normally confronted, namely where the
corporation, in an effort to sell its shares, issues an unduly optimistic
registration statement.27
The fact situation in Blue Chip Stamps has elements that are both
similar and dissimilar to the fact situation in Eason. Just as in Eason,
plaintiffs were neither purchasers nor sellers of stock. The plaintiffs in Blue
Chip Stamps alleged that they would have been purchasers had there not
been fraud in the preparation of the unduly pessimistic registration state-
ment.
Unlike Eason, the problem of damages was amorphous. In Eason,
plaintiffs were liable on a $300,000 guarantee if the guarantee was valid.
They either were liable or they were not. In Blue Chip Stamps, there was a
possibility that, had the registration statement been perfectly neutral in its
disclosure, neither overly optimistic nor overly pessimistic, plaintiffs might
have bought none, some, or all of the stock offered to them. But even in
Blue Chip Stamps, the damage element was not quite as open as the
example, suggested by Justice Rehnquist in his majority opinion, of an
offering to the "whole world" in which thousands of people might later allege
that had the registration statement been less pessimistic they would have
purchased the offered shares.
26. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
27. See, e.g., Escott v. Barchris Construction Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y.
1968).
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In a divided opinion, the Supreme Court decided to adopt the Birn-
baum rule. There were essentially three bases for the Court's decision: (1)
The twenty-some years of judicial and legislative approval of the rule; (2)
the language of the statute and the rule itself; and (3) policy considerations,
primarily with the threat of vexatious litigation.
The first two reasons were generally treated together and the Court
itself recognized that it was not "able to divine from the language of section
10(b) the express 'intent of congress' as to the contours of a private cause of
action under [r]ule 10b-5. ''28 The courts, as has already been pointed
out, 29 have been uniquely able to circumvent the Birnbaum rule in those
instances where it would work an injustice if applied.
While Congress has not acted, and thus arguably has acquiesced in the
Birnbaum rule, it is far more appropriate, because of the complicated milieu
in which the securities laws operate, to assume Congress left to the SEC and
the courts the task of establishing the contours to a rule rather than seeking
to impart specificity through congressional action. As has been amply
demonstrated with regard to the question of what constitutes a security, those
who flourish on the edge of the law are quick to concoct schemes designed to
slip within the letter but not the spirit of the law.30 Thus, to flesh out a
regulatory statute dealing with such a complex and variegated field as
securities, some "catch-all" provision is needed and it was to this end that
section 10(b) was enacted and rule 1 Ob-5 promulgated. 3'
Moreover, the language of the rule itself, with the "in connection with"
language, certainly does not compel the conclusion that one must be a pur-
chaser or seller himself in order to be within the language of the rule. In
effect, the Brinbaum rule rewords rule lOb-5 to provide that "any person in
connection with a purchase or sale by him" who is defrauded through the use
of interstate instrumentalities may sue. It is just as reasonable to read the rule
28. 421 U.S. at 737.
29. Note, Dumping Birnbaum to Force Analysis of the Standing Requirement Un-
der Rule 10b-5, 6 Loy. U. Cm. L.J. 230 (1975).
30. As the Supreme Court stated in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299
(1946), the definition of a security "embodies a flexible rather than a static principle,
one that is capable of adaptation to meet the countless and variable schemes devised by
those who seek the use of the money of others on the promise of profits." And, as
Lewis Lowenfels stated in arguing against the perpetuation of the Birnbaum doctrine:
The infinite variety of problems which the courts are called upon to consider,
the many varieties and complexities of fraud which are possible in contempo-
rary securities markets, the ingenuity of potential wrongdoers-all argue
strongly against having any rigid, inflexible judicial requirement other than the
presence of the fraud itself as a sine qua non of the right to sue. If such a
rigid doctrine is permitted to exist, clever men will always find ways to perpe-
trate their wrongdoings without incurring liability.
Lowenfels, The Demise of the Birnbaum Doctrine: A New Era for Rule l0b-5, 54 VA.
L. REV. 268, 276 (1968).
31. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor, 421 U.S. 723, 765-66 (1975) (Blackmun,
J., dissenting), and the legislative history relied upon therein.
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as providing that "any person who is injured in connection with the purchase
or sale of a security" may sue. Thus, neither the wording of the rule itself
nor the legislative or judicial history compels the conclusion reached by the
Supreme Court.
It would seem to this writer that an honest reading of Blue Chip Stamps
would result in the conclusion that the dominant reason for the decision of
the Court was a desire to delimit the burgeoning litigation involving rule lOb-
5 and to avoid vexacious litigation by permitting certain types of "undesir-
able" litigation to be terminated early in the pleading stage and prior to the
onset of disruptive discovery.3 2  Justice Rehnquist devoted considerable
space to a discussion of vexacious litigation in which, as a result of liberal
pleading rules, a plaintiff who has little chance of prevailing on the merits
can put himself in a posture to be able to resist dismissal or summary
judgment and harass the corporate defendant through the discovery process,
thereby developing a settlement value out of proportion to the merits of the
claim. Justice Rehnquist was also concerned over the extent to which proof
of the claim depended upon oral testimony with little objective corroboration
and the open-endedness of the potential judgments.
The "parade of horribles" approach to decision making. has always
struck this writer as a weak basis upon which to build public policies. In
point of fact, the dangers inherent in the examples offered by the Court may
be more apparent than real. The Court pointed out that the stock of issuers
is listed on financial exchanges utilized by millions of investors and that
corporate representations reach millions more, not just through the financial
journals but also through the nation's daily newspapers. However, SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. 3 3 has already established that those who sell as a
result of a gloomy press release do have a cause of action for damages. This
situation is, of course, within the Birnbaum rule. The converse of Texas
Gulf Sulfur has been effectively foreclosed by the Court in Blue Chip
Stamps: persons who, not owning any stock in Texas Gulf Sulphur, might
claim that they would have bought stock in Texas Gulf Sulphur had there
not been a misleading press release may not now sue. Thus the Birnbaum
rule does effectively delimit the scope of claims against corporations in this
context.
A better, though obviously less definite, approach to this problem would
seem to be the one articulated by the Seventh Circuit in Eason. The court
required both that the plaintiff be within the "special class" protected by the
rule and that his injury be a "direct consequence" of the alleged violation.3 4
In other words, since the general investor has so many investment options
open to him over an undifferentiated time continuum, the Seventh Circuit
32. Id. at 741.
33. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
34. 490 F.2d at 660.
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would require that he establish "but for" the dissemination of the fraudulent-
ly pessimistic information in question, he would have purchased the stock of
the corporation in question. Put another way, he would have to establish
that he was about to make an investment decision at some point in time, that
he had the financial wherewithal to consummate the purchase in question
and that he would have invested in the particular issuer had it not dissemi-
nated the gloomy material. Thus, the "horribles" envisioned by the Su-
preme Court could be handled on the basis of lack of causation rather than
on the basis of standing.
In Blue Chip Stamps the plaintiff might well have been able to meet
these tests because the offer in question was a differentiated offer to particu-
larized persons required by the consent decree. Moreover, the plaintiffs al-
ready had an economic interest in the corporation as a result of the vendor-
vendee relationship. The Blue Chip Stamps plaintiff would still need to estab-
lish that he had the economic wherewithal to make the purchase (the number
of shares which he could buy was limited by the consent decree itself) and
that the pessimistic statements were sufficiently material to affect his invest-
ment decision.
Turning again to Eason, causality requirements most certainly could
have been met there since the plaintiff obviously would not have issued his
guarantee unless the controlled corporation was issuing its stock. Thus, if
the issuance of stock was fraudulently induced, so also was the guarantee.
The Supreme Court recognized that some noble plaintiffs might be
foreclosed from the federal courts by its imposition of the Birnbaum rule but
thought that the number so affected would be. so small that the detriment
would be more than outweighed by the benefit in avoiding vexacious
litigation and open-ended claims. The three classes envisioned by the
Supreme Court were as follows: 35 (1) Potential purchasers, either in the
distribution or trading markets, who alleged they did not purchase because of
the gloomy representations; (2) actual shareholders who alleged they decid-
ed not to sell because of unduly optimistic representations or failure to
disclose unfavorable material; and (3) shareholders, creditors and perhaps
others related to the issuer who suffered loss as a result of insider activities in
connection with the purchase or sale of securities. With respect to the first
example, this article has already suggested that the "but for" or causality
requirement may be sufficient to limit the instances in which rule lOb-5 is
applicable, though admittedly this approach does not lend itself to resolution
at the pleading stage and would probably require the advent of discovery
activity.
In regards to the second illustration, if there is no sale at all, even
absent the Birnbaum rule, there is no basis for a 1Ob-5 action under the law
35. 421 U.S. at 737.
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as it now stands except in a prophylactic, injunctive type proceeding. 36
With respect to the third illustration, if the shareholders or creditors in
question can bring themselves within the "special class" rule and establish
the causal connection between the purchase or sale in question and their
activity, there is no reason why a cause of action under rule lOb-5 should not
lie.
The Supreme Court rationalized its approach on the basis that often a
derivative action in favor of the corporation will lie if the corporation is itself
a purchaser or seller of securities. While this may be true in many
instances, Eason is an excellent illustration of a situation where the deriva-
tive action may be of no value to the injured plaintiff. In Eason, the
corporation (which issued its shares because of an allegedly false representa-
tion) itself became insolvent. Accordingly, any recovery by the corporation
could be consumed by creditors of the corporation with the result that the
funds available for distribution to the shareholders upon liquidation of a
corporation would not be sufficient to compensate them for the amounts paid
out on the guarantees.
With respect to the GMAC notes assumed by the corporation acquiring
defendant's business and guaranteed by the plaintiff shareholders, it is
arguable that if the corporation (which issued securities in the transaction)
can rescind its assumption of the notes, then the guarantors should be able to
join in the suit and the guarantee of the notes should fall. However, it is
questionable whether the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction, coupled with the
existence of the Birnbaum rule, would permit a plaintiff separate and distinct
from the corporation to couple his claim with the corporation's in a federal
court action. Although there is a split among the circuits on this issue,
pendent jurisdiction properly relates to joinder of claims, not joinder of
parties . 7 From a jurisdictional standpoint, it is one thing to permit a party
properly in court to add another count to his complaint but it is quite another
to permit a person who has no federal cause of action to piggyback
jurisdiction.
Another area where the application of the Birnbaum doctrine may
either work an inequity or force the courts to adopt strained constructions of
36. Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967). The Se-
curities and Exchange Commission may also sue for injunctive relief without there hav-
ing actually been as yet a purchase or sale.
37. The question of whether the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction is broad enough
to give federal courts power over additional parties has not yet been resolved. See Moor
v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973), where Mr. Justice Marshall distinguished
United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966), on the basis that in Moor the
exercise of pendent jurisdiction "would bring us to bring an entirely new party-a new
defendant-into each litigation." However, the Second Circuit has permitted pendent
jurisdiction over related claims by additional parties. See Leather's Best, Inc. v. S.S.
Mormaclynx, 451 F.2d 800 (2d Cir. 1971).
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"who is a seller" occurs in the merger situation. The Supreme Court, in
SEC v. National Securities, Inc.,38 held that where the acquiring corporation
had obtained control of the target corporation's board and caused the target
corporation to issue a misleading proxy statement in order to secure share-
holder approval of the merger, the target company's shareholders "pur-
chased" shares in the new company by exchanging their old stock for the
new shares. 39  But what if, instead of the format used, the acquiring
corporation had been merged into a target corporation. In other words,
what if the minnow had swallowed the whale. 40
The Supreme Court in National Securities recognized that there would
be a sale in such circumstances-but the sale would have been by the
shareholders of the acquirer who, rather than being the injured parties in the
transaction, were the real culprits. In the latter circumstance, the injured
parties are those shareholders, namely of target corporation, who have not
sold their shares. Their approval of the transaction was obtained through the
misleading proxy statement. But they retained their shares.
While it may be that rule 14a-9 41 may provide a remedy, that fact
alone should not foreclose a rule lOb-5 action because, just as was the case
in National Securities, the transaction might involve a company not subject
to the proxy solicitation rules. 42
'It could be argued, just as it was in Farris v. Glen Alden Corp.,43 that
form should be ignored and that the true sellers of shares were the
shareholders of the target corporation, notwithstanding the fact that they
held the same certificate both before and after the transaction. On the other
hand, rather than straining to treat "non-sellers" as sellers, it would seem to
make more sense merely to hold that the merger transaction involves a
purchase or sale of securities and, if the consummation of the merger was
accomplished through fraud in the solicitation of proxies, that the fraud
"touched" the sale of securities and those consequentially injured thereby
have standing to sue. This was the approach of the Seventh Circuit in
Eason, an approach whose luster has not been dimmed by the cloud cast by
the Supreme Court in Blue 'Chip Stamps, even though its legal effect has
been undercut.
38. 393 U.S. 453 (1969).
39. Id. at 467.
40. Upside down mergers-where the smaller company "acquires" the larger com-
pany-are not that uncommon. While they sometimes occur in the parent-subsidiary
context, they have also in effect occurred where two independent companies are in-
volved. For example, in Farris v. Glen Alden Corp., 393 Pa. 427, 143 A.2d 25 (1958),
the court stated that, notwithstanding the form of the transaction, "Glen Alden does not
in fact acquire List, rather, List acquires Glen Alden."
41. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1975), promulgated under § 14(a) of the 1934 Securi-
ties Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970).
42. 393 U.S. 453, 468 (1969); see sections 12(g)(2)(G) and 14(d)(1) of the
1934 Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 781(g)(2)(G), 78n(d)(1) (1970).
43. 393 Pa. 427, 143 A.2d 25 (1958).
SECURITIES LAW
SECTION 13(d) AND Mosinee Paper
Last year, the Seventh Circuit handed down its decision in Mosinee
Paper Corp. v. Rondeau,44 in which it considered the appropriate relief to
be granted when a 5 percent shareholder fails to timely file Schedule 13D as
required by the Williams Act.45  By May of 1971, the defendant had
established a 5 percent position in the stock of Mosinee Paper Corporation.
Within ten days after establishing such a position, he was required by the
Williams Act to file Schedule 13D.46  However, he failed to file the
appropriate schedule and continued acquiring Mosinee Paper stock. By
August he had achieved an 8 percent position in the stock and thereafter
filed the Schedule 13D.
That a violation of the Williams Act had occurred was conceded in all
stages of the litigation. The issue before the district court was the appropri-
ate relief to be granted. The plaintiff corporation sought an injunction that
would either prohibit defendant from voting or pledging the stock or from
acquiring additional shares or, alternatively, require defendant to divest
himself of the stock. The district court granted summary judgment in favor
of the defendant on basically two grounds: (a) no irreparable harm was
suffered by the plaintiff corporation and (b) defendant's failure to file was
not motivated by bad faith. The timing involved in the particular facts of
the case lent plausibility to the lack of bad faith argument because until the
prior December, filing had not been required until a 10 percent position had
been obtained. 47
The Seventh Circuit, in effect, held that the violation itself established
harm but went on to find that the corporation had suffered actual harm. The
harm would flow from the failure of the corporation to receive notice of a
fact to which it had a right, namely, the existence of a 5 percent holder of its
shares and the nature of his intentions, which resulted in a delay in its efforts
to make an appropriate response to the new condition. It is also arguable
that the shareholders of the corporation, both those who sell prior to the
filing of the Schedule 13D and those who retain their shares, are harmed
because relevant data, which may be material to them in making a decision
to hold or retain their shares, is withheld despite a statutory mandate for
disclosure.
Judge Pell dissented48 and once again his dissent found favor in the
44. 500 F.2d 1011 (7th Cir. 1974).
45. Act of July 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454. The Williams Act
added sections (d) and (e) to section 13 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and sec-
tions (d), (e), and (f), to section 14 of that Act.
46. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (1975).
47. Section 14(d)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78n(d)
(1), was so amended in 1970 by Act of Dec. 22, .1970, Pub. L. No. 91-567, 84 Stat.
1497.
48. 500 F.2d at 1017.
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Supreme Court. The focus of his dissenting opinion was upon the necessity
for irreparable harm, not just harm, in order to support the grant of the
extraordinary relief of an injunction. The Supreme Court adopted Judge
Pell's position and, in attempting to support its decision, reviewed the
legislative concern with abuses in tender offers which prompted the Williams
bill and found that the present facts gave rise to "none of the evils to which
the Williams Act was directed."'49
The reasoning of the Supreme Court is questionable on several grounds.
First of all, it is section 14(d) 50 which is aimed at tender offers; section
13(d) 5 1 is aimed at triggering notification solely upon the accumulation of
the specified block of shares. In rule 10b-5 language, the Supreme Court
"omitted to state a material fact" when it read the purpose of the Williams
Act as being to insure that public shareholders who were confronted by the
cash tender offer would have adequate information about the offering party.
The purpose was also to require the dissemination of the required informa-
tion when a holder reaches the specified position, whether or not he then
intends a tender offer. 'In other words, the potential for control is the
relevant fact -requiring prompt disclosure. 52 This fact is buttressed by the
existence of the exemptive power which Congress conferred to the SEC in
section 13(d)(6)(D). Under that section the SEC was given the discretion-
ary power to exempt from the Schedule 13(d) filing an acquisition of shares
which is not entered into for the purpose of influencing the control of the
issuer. 53 Untill the SEC does act to exempt those transactions which are not
49. 422 U.S. 49, 59 (1975).
50. Section 14(d)(1) provides that it is illegal "to make a tender offer" for an
equity security registered pursuant to section 12 of the Act if the tender-offeror would
thereafter own more than 5 percent of such security unless the statement required by
section 13(d) of the Act is filed. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1970).
51. Section 13(d)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (1970), provides:
Any person who, after acquiring directly or indirectly the beneficial ownership
of any equity security of a class which is registered pursuant to section 781
of this title . . ., is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more than
5 per centum of such class shall, within ten days after such acquisition send
to the issuer of the security at its principle executive office, by registered or
certified mail, send to each exchange where the security is traded, and file with
the Commission a statement containing such of the following information, and
such additional information, as the Commission may by rules and regulations
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection
of investors ....
52. H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968), reported in 1968 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2812, 2818, states (emphasis added):
The failure to provide adequate disclosure to investors in connection with a
cash takeover bid or other acquisitions which may cause a shift in control is
in sharp contrast to the regulatory requirements applicable where one company
offers to exchange its shares for those of another, or where a contest for con-
trol takes the form of a proxy fight.
The purpose of section 13(d) is to require disclosure of information by persons
who have acquired a substantial interest, or increased their interest in the
equity securities of a company by a substantial amount, within a relatively
short period of time.
53. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(6)(D) (1970).
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for the purpose of influencing the control of the issuer, they are in fact
covered by the statute.
Moreover, it is doubtful that the acquisition of the stock in question by
the defendant was not made with a view toward an eventual tender offer.
When the defendant filed his Schedule 13D in August, the statement did
recite that consideration was currently being given to making a public cash
tender offer. The trial court and Judge Pell apparently accepted the
defendant's contention that consideration of a cash tender offer did not arise
until August and that prior to that time such an action had not been
considered. This certainly places great faith upon the uncorroborated
testimony by an interested witness of his subjective intent or lack thereof.
Finally, the Supreme Court intimated somewhat ambiguously in a
footnote that injunctive relief, such as prohibiting the voting of shares, is only
appropriate pending compliance with the reporting requirements. 54 If this is
true-and it is inconceivable that the Supreme Court had this in mind-there
would be no reason to file a Schedule 13D until such time as injunctive relief
is sought; once a failure to file is challenged, one need only file to forestall
any relief. In this writer's opinion, it was to preclude such dilatory tactics
that the Seventh Circuit took a hard line and found that the existence of a
violation itself supported injunctive relief. Under the Seventh Circuit's
approach, failure to file would carry with it serious consequences. Under
the Supreme Court's approach, failure to file is a desirable ploy to hide from
both the management and the public the existence of the substantial position
in the stock of the corporation as long as possible. Once it is discovered and
legal action threatened, the failure to file can simply be cured.
-It certainly appears that the Seventh Circuit's opinion is the more
enlightened one. Unfortunately, after the Supreme Court's decision, it is not
the law. As pointed out previously, however, the element of bad faith was
treated as missing in the present case because of the recent change in the
percentage which triggered reporting requirements from 10 percent down to
5 percent. At the time the action was filed, the defendant only held 8
percent. In the future, it is unlikely that either investors or raiders, as the
case may be, achieving a more than 5 percent position in the corporation's
stock, will be able to allege and establish good faith in their failure to file.
Consequently, the decision of the Supreme Court may be simply "much ado
about nothing."
In any event, it would appear that there is still the possibility that the
SEC could bring an action for injunctive relief in a section 13(d) violation of
the type litigated in Mosinee. The private plaintiff, as was pointed out in
54. 422 U.S. at 59 n.9, where the Court indicated that it was not called upon
to decide whether an injunction could be obtained against exercising voting rights "pend-
ing compliance with the reporting requirements."
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Judge Pell's dissent 55 and the majority opinion of the Supreme Court, 56 has
two or possibly three hurdles: He (or it) must establish that a private cause
of action exists, that he has standing to bring suit, and that the relief sought
is appropriate. On the other hand, it is clear that the SEC has authority to
bring injunctive actions for violations of the Act.57 It is also well estab-
lished that the SEC, in connection with its injunctive action, is entitled to
ancillary relief. 58  It does not seem at all unreasonable that a defendant
who violates the Act by failing to file after achieving a 5 percent position in
the shares, and who continues to acquire additional shares, should be
enjoined from voting the additional shares for some designated period of
time. This would neutralize the effect of the defendant's violation of the
statute. It may be that the five year disenfranchisement imposed by the
Seventh Circuit was so long as to be punitive in nature. On the other hand,
disenfranchisement for a year or two would appear to be a reasonable means
for effectuating the policy of the state.
WHEN A NOTE IS A SECURITY
Over the past few years, there has been considerable administrative and
judicial activity involved with the determination of what constitutes a
security. Tax shelters, such as investment condominiums, 59  orange
groves60 and cattle feeding and breeding operations6' have been determined
to involve securities, at least under certain circumstances, as have also
franchises,6 2 pyramid sales arrangements 63 and the sale of Scotch whiskey
55. 500 F.2d at 1017.
56. 422 U.S. at 61.
57. Section 21e of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78u(e)
(1970), provides as follows:
Whenever it shall appear to the Commission that any person is engaged or
about to engage in any acts or practices which constitute or will constitute a
violation of the provisions of this chapter, or of any rule or regulation there-
under, it may in its discretion bring an action in the proper district court . . .
to enjoin such act or practices, and upon a proper showing a permanent or tem-
porary injunction or restraining order shall be granted without bond.
58. In SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301, 1307 (2d Cir. 1971), the
court stated:
However, despite some legislative history purportedly to the contrary, we do
not read § 21(e) as restricting the remedies which the SEC can pursue to in-junctive relief. . . . Moreover, in other contexts the Supreme Court has up-
held the power of the Government without specific statutory authority to seek
restitution, and has upheld the lower courts in granting restitution, as an ancil-
lary remedy in the exercise of the courts' general equity powers to afford com-
plete relief.
59. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5347 (Jan. 4, 1973), [1972-1973 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 79,163.
60. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
61. American Dairy Leasing Corp., SEC Div. Corp. Fin. No-Action Letter (Dec.
3, 1971), [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 78,584.
62. Stanley v. Commercial Courier Serv., Inc., 301 SEc. REG. & LAw REP. A-9 (D.
Ore. April 29, 1975). See also 49 Op. CAL. Arr'Y GEN. 124 (1967).
63. Davis v. Aveco Corp., 371 F. Supp. 782 (N.D. Ohio 1974); SEC v. Glen W.
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warehouse receipts.6 4 The question has even been raised with respect to the
sale of gold or silver bullion.6 5
As is evident from the foregoing discussion, the direction of this activity
has been, generally speaking, in the direction of expanding the notion of
what constitutes a security. Until the last year or two, this trend had also
held true when the question for consideration was whether or not a note
constituted a security. Probably the most publicized case in this area
developed out of the 1970 Penn Central bankruptcy when litigation en-
sued 66 as to whether the Penn Central's commercial paper, though within
the letter of the exception for commercial paper in the definition of a
security under the 1934 Act, was nevertheless subject to the anti-fraud
provisions of that act. The district court's opinion in the Penn Central case
followed the four-pronged test adopted by Judge Sprecher in Sanders v. John
Nuveen & Co.6 7
Section 3(a)(10) of the 1934 Act defines security to mean "any note
. . .but shall not include . . .any note . . . which has a maturity at the
time of issuance of not exceeding nine months."6 8  Judge Sprecher's opinion
in Sanders disregarded not only form for substance but also (quite properly)
a literal reading of the statute. Implicitly relying upon the condition in the
introduction to the definitions set forth in section 3(a) of the 1934 Act that
such definitions shall apply "unless the context otherwise requires", 69 he
looked to the following four criteria which ought to be met if the instruments
in question are "true" short term paper excluded from the definition of
security under the 1934 Act:
. [The instrument must be] (1) prime quality negotiable com-
mercial paper (2) of a type not ordinarily purchased by the general
public, that is, (3) paper issued to facilitate well recognized types
of current operational business requirements and (4) of a type
eligible for discounting by Federal Reserve 'banks.70
Turner Enterprises Inc., 348 F. Supp. 766 (D. Ore. 1972), aff'd, 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.
1973); State v. Hawaii Market Center Inc., 51 Hawaii 642, 485 P.2d 105 (1971).
64. SEC v. Haffenden-Rimar Int. Inc., 496 F.2d 1192 (4th Cir. 1974); SEC v.
Glen-Arden Commodities, Inc., 493 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1974); SEC v. M.A. Lundy As-
sociates, 362 F. Supp. 226 (D.R.I. 1973).
65. Rare Metals Investment Corp., SEC Div. Corp. Fin. No-Action Letter (avail.
Mar. 28, 1974), 247 SEc. REG. & LAW REP. C-1.
66. See Welsh Foods Inc. v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder]
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,806 (1974).
67. 463 F.2d 1075, 1079 (7th Cir. 1972).
68. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1970).
69. Id. The Supreme Court itself has recognized that the general definitions are
qualified with the phrase "unless the context otherwise requires." SEC v. National Sec.,
Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 466 (1969).
70. 463 F.2d at 1079. These criteria were extracted from a 1961 release of the
Securities Exchange Commission interpreting the 1933 Act's exemption of short-
term commercial paper. 17 C.F.R. § 231.4412 (1975).
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The commercial paper involved in Sanders was issued by a company at
a time when it was insolvent. Furthermore, it was sold to forty-two
purchasers in an aggregate face amount in excess of 1.5 million dollars. After
applying the aforementioned standards to these facts, the court held that the
notes failed to meet any of the above four standards and accordingly were
securities subject to the anti-fraud provisions of the 1934 Act.
Judge Sprecher was undoubtedly correct in his assumption that Con-
gress did not intend to exempt notes such as those involved in Sanders from
the definition of a security. At the time the securities laws were enacted,
commercial paper was primarily issued by industrial companies to facilitate
seasonal financing and a major portion of it ended up in the portfolios of
banks. Today, a substantial amount of commercial paper is issued by non-
industrial concerns such as finance companies (as was the case in Sanders)
and, instead of being issued purely for seasonal needs, in which case the
paper is liquidated at the end of its term through the proceeds from the sale
of inventory, it is rolled over as in the case of Penn Central. In this latter
situation, supposedly short term paper becomes, in effect, a substitute for
long-term financing. 7 1 Thus, the context today is a substantially different
one from that which existed in 1934 when the statutory provisions were
enacted.
A year later, the Second Circuit, in Zeller v. Bogue Electric Manufac-
turing Corp.,72 agreed with the Seventh Circuit's decision in Sanders that
"the mere fact that a note has a maturity of less than nine months does not
take the case out of [r]ule lob-5" 73 and held that a demand note issued by
a parent to its subsidiary was a security subject to the 1934 Act. The court
fqcused upon the fact that the noteholder (the subsidary) was occupying the
position of an investor. Sanders was followed most recently in Zabriskie v.
Lewis, 74 where a woman who sought to invest in real estate was induced to
lend her money to a "genius" to invest in a corporation which was going to
be "one of the greatest stock developments" that ever existed. She received
two 60-day notes. The court adopted the commercial-investment distinction
and found that the notes were securities within the meaning of rule 10b-5.
Thus, it is clear that today the character of the instrument cannot be
determined merely by looking at the term appearing on the face of the
instrument.
71. For an excellent discussion of the history of the marketing of short-term com-
mercial paper, see Note, The Commercial Paper Market and the Securities Acts, 39 U.
Cm. L. Rnv. 362, 365-71 (1972).
72. 476 F.2d 795 (2d Cir. 1973).
73. Id. at 800.
74. 507 F.2d 546 (10th Cir. 1974). The foregoing cases, holding that short-term
paper may nonetheless be a security, and the cases dealing with the converse (discussed
in text beginning at note 75 infra) are discussed in a two part series of articles, Lipton
and Katz, "Notes" Are (Are Not?) Always Securities-A Review, 29 Bus. LAW. 861
(1974); Lipton and Katz, "Notes" Are Not Always Securities, 30 Bus. LAw. 763 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as Lipton and Katz].
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In the past year, the Seventh Circuit, in C.N.S. Enterprises, Inc. v. G.
& G. Enterprises, Inc.,75 was confronted with the converse of the Sanders
case: the notes in question had a maturity date in excess of nine months and
therefore were outside the exception contained within the definition of
security in section 3(a)(9) of the 1934 Act. Presumably, therefore, the
notes were within the general definition of a security including "any note".
However, it was argued that, notwithstanding the fact that the notes in
question were encompassed by a literal reading of the statute, the context
was such that they should be considered outside the intended scope of the
statute. Judge Sprecher again wrote the opinion of the court but this time,
rather than embracing an expansive approach, he delimited the scope of the
securities laws and held that the notes in question were not securities within
the purpose of the 1934 Act.
The fact situation under consideration by the court can be summarized
briefly as follows. Plaintiffs purchased the "fixtures, merchandise, business
and good will" of an existing business from defendants. In connection with
the transaction, they assumed a chattel mortgage on the fixtures, giving their
note to the bank, and borrowed an additional sum from the bank evidenced
by a note secured by a junior chattel mortgage.
In distinguishing Sanders, Judge Sprecher characterized it as involving
an "investment" instrument, whereas the notes in question in the present
case involved "commercial" instruments. The court recognized that it is one
thing to state a "commercial-investment" dichotomy but a much more
complex task to apply it to varying sets of facts. It would appear that
according to Judge Sprecher, the key to unraveling the dilemma imposed by
varying fact situations was to determine from where the "impetus" for the
transaction came. After pointing out that every lender is in effect an
investor and every investor in a non-equity security is in effect a lender, he
went on to state:
On the other hand, the polarized extremes are conceptually identi-
fiable: buying shares in a common stock of a publicly held cor-
poration, where the impetus for -the transactions comes from the
person with the money, is an investment; borrowing money from a
bank to finance the purchase of an automobile, where the impetus
for the transaction comes from the person who needs the money,
is a loan. In between is a gray area which, in the absence of fur-
ther congressional indication of intent or Supreme Court construc-
tion, has been and must be in the future subjected to case-by-case
treatment. 78
While the opinion analyzed the decisions in other circuits which have
intervened between Sanders and C.N.S. Enterprises, and also enumerated
75. 508 F.2d 1354 (7th Cir. 1975).
76. Id. at 1359.
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the tests suggested in the literature,7T the conclusion that the notes in
question were not securities appeared to be based upon the fact that the
bank was in no way a joint venturer with the plaintiffs and the fact that the
impetus for the transaction came from the plaintiffs and not from the bank.
With all due respect to Judge Sprecher, who has exhibited both
imagination and understanding in his many opinions dealing with the
securities laws over the past few years, the introduction of the concept of
"impetus" is more a distraction than an aid in resolving the very complex
question concerning the circumstances under which a note is a security and
those under which it is not.
The impetus approach, in this author's opinion, affords no real assist-
ance. Consider Judge Sprecher's example at the end of the spectrum where
he suggests that a security is obviously present, namely, the sale of common
shares. He suggests in this circumstance that the impetus comes from the
person with the money and that therefore this reflects the fact that a security
is involved. He would contrast this with a loan transaction in which an
individual goes to the bank-in which case the impetus comes from the per-
son who needs the money.
On closer examination, however, the impetus in both cases comes from
the person who needs the money, not the person with the money. 'It is true
that, with respect to the sale of stock in the trading market, the impetus
could be said to come from the person with the money. But to avoid
comparing apples and oranges (issuance of a note vis-a-vis trading in stock),
the relevant market to look at with respect to stock is the distribution market
in connection with the issuance of stock by the issuer. In that market, the
very existence of the investment banking community, and the premium paid
to underwriters for the sale of stock in the initial distribution thereof, reflects
the fact that the impetus comes from the issuer of the security, who utilizes
the services of underwriters, and not from the person with the money who is
buying the stock. The whole scheme of the 1933 Act is to protect the
potential purchaser of stock from unscrupulous sales activity in connection
with the issuance (distribution) of the security.
In this writer's opinion, it is possible to be no more precise than to take
the investment-commercial dichotomy and seek to flesh it out with various
factual catagories which may point in one direction or the other. While
many factors have been suggested as being relevant, there are basically three
critical factors: (a) the character and sophistication of the buyer or holder of
the instrument; (b) the purposes for which the issuer of the instrument
creates the instrument; and (c) the term of the instrument. Each of these
factors will now be examined in more detail.
77. See Comment, Commercial Notes and Definition of "Security" Under Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934: A Note Is A Note Is A Note, 52 NEB. L. REv. 478 (1973).
See also Lipton and Katz, note 74 supra.
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With respect to the character of the holder, it is fitting to first look to
the example of a bank as an acquirer of the instrument. Banks have both a
commercial side and an investment side and in many instances the nature of
the transaction could be inferred by the office of the bank in which it was
consummated. On the other hand, when an insurance company purchases
an instrument, it could normally be assumed that the transaction is an
investment because insurance companies are not in the business of extending
credit but rather in investing their funds so as to be able to meet obligations
to their policy holders. Similarly, an individual, such as the defrauded
woman in Zabriskie,78 who was originally interested in the opportunity to
invest in real estate and was induced to lend money to a promoter and its
corporation, is generally not in the business of extending credit but rather in
making investments.
Looking at the purpose for which the issuer of the instrument creates it,
an individual who seeks funds and issues his note for consumer goods is
involved in a credit and not an investment transaction. Thus, the nature of
the goods tells something about the nature of the transaction. Even if one is
dealing with business goods, if the purpose of the transaction is to provide
the funds to acquire specific property-particularly if the issuer of the
instrument creates a security interest in the property to be acquired to secure
the instrument-one is most likely dealing with a commercial and not an
investment situation. If, however, the purpose of the transaction is to
provide risk capital or working capital for the issuer of the instrument, then
the transaction most likely is an investment and not a commercial transac-
tion. This does not mean that it will always be easy to determine whether or
not the purpose of the transaction was to provide working capital rather than
to acquire specific assets.
With respect to the term of the transaction, the longer the term of the
instrument the more likely it is an investment instrument and the shorter the
term of the instrument the more likely it is a commercial instrument. For
example, common stock is an instrument with a term extending into perpetu-
ity. While a particular holder of the instrument may hold it for only a short
time, the instrument itself, reflecting the permanent capital in an entity of
perpetual duration, is obviously a long-term instrument. At the other end of
the spectrum, "pure" commercial paper, issued for thirty to ninety days to
carry seasonal inventories, is obviously a credit transaction. Most notes
purchased by an insurance company will have a term of five years or more
and thus will represent an investment transaction rather than a commercial
transaction. Somewhere in between the insurance company transaction and
the pure commercial paper situation would be the three-year car loan, but
there the question of whether a security is involved could be resolved by
resort to the nature of the issuer and the purpose of the transaction.
78. 507 F.2d 546 (10th Cir. 1974). See also note 74 supra.
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With respect to the term of the instrument, there are obviously many
transactions that do not fit within the general pattern of a long term
indicating the likelihood that a security is involved. For example, in the
financing of real estate, a commercial transaction is usually involved and
fifteen to twenty-five year terms are quite common. At the other end of the
spectrum, the defrauded woman in Zabriskie received a note which was by
its terms to be outstanding for only two months. Yet it was held to
constitute a security. But again, the other two factors, the nature of the
holder and the purpose of the transaction, pointed in the direction of a
security. Thus, while particular fact patterns may not be free from ambigui-
ty, looking to the nature of the purchaser, the purpose of the issuer and the
term of the instrument will at least provide some keys which should point in
the proper direction.
There is another approach which merits consideration, however, when a
note is given in connection with the purchase of business assets, as was the
case in C.N.S. Enterprises. It would appear that the focus, rather than
being upon whether the note given by the buyer in acquiring the business
was a security, might better be upon whether what the seller is selling,
irrespective of form, is a security. Consider the various permutations which
may be involved when one corporation (referred to as "Acquirer") buys the
business of another (referred to as "Target").
It is clear that if Acquirer issues its stock to purchase the stock of
Target from the latter's shareholders, the securities laws apply since there is
obviously an exchange (sale and purchase) of two securities. It is also clear
that if Acquirer issues its notes for the stock of Target, the securities laws
apply since there is clearly involved the sale of a security (Target's stock) by
Target's shareholders. Finally, if Acquirer pays cash for the stock of Target,
the securities laws are applicable for the reason stated immediately above.
Assuming that there are misstatements by the seller as to the condition of the
business being sold, which underlies the stock of Target, the foregoing are
classical situations for the application of the securities laws.
Consider another situation. Instead of the stock of Target being sold,
Target sells its assets subject to liabilities (referred to as "net assets"),
receives the consideration from Acquirer and thereupon dissolves, distribut-
ing its assets to its shareholders. Once again, if Acquirer issues its shares in
return for the net assets of Target, there is no question but that there is a
transaction involving the purchase or sale of a security, namely, the issuance
of Acquirer's shares, and rule 10b-5, for example, would apply. On the
other hand, if Acquirer were to issue its notes in exchange for the net assets
of Target, the teaching of C.N.S. Enterprises is that there is no security
involved and consequently no basis for the application of the securities laws.
Similarly, if Acquirer paid cash for the net assets of Target, it is suspected
that there are few commentators, and no cases, which would hold that there
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is yet a security involved in the transaction such that the security laws can
apply. The closest judicial recognition of this possibility appears to be Judge
Sprecher's earlier opinion in Sanders v. John Nuveen & Company, Inc.,79 in
which he indicated that even if the commercial paper which Nuveen was
selling was not itself a security, the placing of capital in Nuveen's hands for
investment created an investment contract.8 0
It would appear that the thread common to all six situations is that the
seller has been conducting a business in which the buyer seeks to invest. The
investment character of the transaction is clear when what the buyer
purchases is stock, irrespective of the consideration issued by the buyer.
However, when it purchases net assets, it is just as clearly making an
investment as when it purchases stock. Conceivably, the form in which the
business is sold may turn upon the number of shareholders of Target since a
large number of shareholders may make the transaction too cumbersome if
effected in the form of a stock acquisition. Surely such a factor should not
control indirectly the determination of whether a security is involved in the
transaction.
Should form control substance? The Supreme Court has repeatedly
counseled to the contrary, particularly where the issue is whether a security
is involved.81 It appears to this writer that considering the purpose of the
securities laws, namely to protect an investor, form should not be allowed to
hide the true substance of the transaction. Thus, the contract whereby a
purchaser acquired net assets (or "hard" assets coupled with goodwill), 82
and not just "dead" assets, may properly be characterized as an investment
contract and thus a security, thereby subjecting the seller to liability under
rule 1Ob-5 if the other requisite elements of securities fraud are present.
In taking the investment contract approach to resolution of the C.N.S.
Enterprises situation, one conceptual difficulty arises. Most of the litigation
involving the question of whether an investment contract exists has focused
upon the so-called active-passive dichotomy. For example, in the sale of
orange groves or oil leases, the buyer was a passive participant in an
enterprise operated by the active participant.8 3  Where no such active-
79. See text at note 67 supra.
80. 463 F.2d at 1080.
81. SEC v. Joiner Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 351 (1943); SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328
U.S. 293, 299 (1946).
82. To get at the essence of the situation, the most rational distinction to be made
in determining whether the sale of assets of a business constitutes the sale of a security
is whether the value of the assets is established, at least in part, by looking through the
capitalized earnings value of the business. If earnings are a factor in determining a
price of the assets, then obviously something more than "mere" assets are being sold
and the situation is an "investment" situation rather than a purchase of tangible prop-
erty.
83. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299-300 (1946); SEC v. Joiner Corp.,
320 U.S. 344, 348-49 (1943).
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passive dichotomy has been found, the existence of a security has usually
been decided in the negative.8 4
However, it can be argued that most of the opinions denying the
existence of a security can be reconciled with a holding that C.N.S.
Enterprises did involve an investment contract because, in effect, those
opinions merely held that the plaintiff was not buying into a business but
rather was purchasing tangible assets or a service or a license. That the
purchaser in C.N.S. Enterprises was buying into a business and not merely
acquiring some assets cannot be gainsaid.8 5 Stock in a closely held corpora-
tion is no less a security because it is held by only one shareholder and the
sale of such stock to only one purchaser who will control the operation of the
business after the purchase does not make it any less the sale of a security to
him. If an enterprise, the nature of which is the subject of investment,
exists, then the active-passive dichotomy is irrelevant since the underlying
question has already been answered in the affirmative.
PROXY SOLICITATION
Northway, Inc. v. TSC Industries, Inc.8 6 involved a not atypical
corporate acquisition challenged as fraudulent for misleading disclosure
under the proxy rules. The transaction involved a stock-for-asset transac-
tion8 7 in which the acquiring corporation (National) first purchased what
was probably a controlling block of shares8 8 for cash, obtained working
control of the board of directors, and then, in effect, merged the two
corporations, arguably at a disadvantageous price to the minority sharehold-
ers of the target corporation (TSC). Northway, a minority shareholder,
alleged that the proxy solicitation necessary to authorize the transactions
violated rule 14a-9 of the 1934 Act.
The court had under consideration three legal issues and the factual
environment attendant to them: (a) The obligation to disclose a change in
control of the issuer within the prior year, if such had occurred; (b) the
84. See, e.g., Mr. Steak, Inc. v. River City Steak, Inc., 460 F.2d 666 (10th Cir.
1972).
85. 508 F.2d at 1355. The opinion recites that "good will" was purchased and the
plaintiffs alleged that an inducement in acquiring the business were the monthly sales
figures given to them by defendants.
86. 512 F.2d 324 (7th Cir. 1975).
87. The opinion erroneously characterizes the transaction as a "stock-for-stock
purchase". In a stock-for-asset transaction, the seller of the assets, after receiving the
stock from the purchaser, dissolves and distributes the purchaser's stock to the seller's
shareholders. Thus the seller's shareholders end up with stock of the purchaser but in
a two-step transaction. The basic transaction is stock for assets.
88. 512 F.2d at 327-28. Approximately one-third of the stock was acquired from
the Schmidt family, which was probably sufficient for control. In point of fact, after
the acquisition of this block of shares, four nominees of the acquiring corporation were
elected to the ten-man board of directors. In addition, officers of the acquiring corpora-
tion became the chief executive officers of TSC.
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standard for determining whether a misrepresentation is material so as to
establish the causal link between the misrepresentation and the approval of
the transactions; and (c) the duty of investigation, which devolves upon a
controlling shareholder when he sells his stock, as to the character and
intentions of the purchaser. Only the second of the three issues will be
treated in this article.89
The materiality-causation syndrome was resolved by the Supreme Court
in Mills v. Electric Autolite Co.,90 when Mr. Justice Harlan stated:
Where the misstatement or omission in a proxy statement has
been shown to be "material," as it was found to be here, that deter-
mination itself indubitabily embodies a conclusion that the defect
was of such a character that it might have been considered impor-
tant by a reasonable shareholder who was in the process of deciding
how to vote. This requirement that the defect have a significant
propensity to affect the voting process is found in the express terms
of [r]ule 14a-9, and it adequately serves the purpose of ensuring
that a cause of action cannot be established by proof of a defect
so trivial, or so unrelated to the transaction for which approval is
sought, that correction of the defect or imposition of liability
would not further the interests protected by [section] 14(a).
There is no need to supplement this requirement, as did the
Court of Appeals, with a requirement of proof of whether the
defect actually had a decisive effect on the voting. Where there
has been a finding of materiality, a shareholder has made a suffi-
cient showing of a casual relationship between the violation and
the injury for which he seeks redress if, as here, he proves that
the proxy solicitation itself, rather than the particular defect in the
solicitation materials, was an essential link in the accomplishment
of the transaction. This objective test will avoid the impracticalities
of determining how many votes were affected, and, by resolving
doubts in favor of those the statute is designed to protect, will
effectuate the congressional policy of ensuring that the share-
holders are able to make an informed choice when they are con-
sulted on corporate transactions. 91
While Mr. Justice Harlan's opinion now makes it clear that once materiality
is established, specific proof of causation is unnecessary (provided that the
89. With respect to the first issue, the court acknowledged that Schedule 14A, Item
5 requires a proxy statement to disclose a change in the control of the issuer occurring
since the beginning of the last fiscal year. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101, item 5(e) (1975).
However, the court was of the opinion that the issue of control was a factual issue which
could not be determined on a motion for summary judgment. 512 F.2d at 329. With
respect to the third issue, the court did hold that there was a duty to investigate the
transferee whenever a controlling shareholder transfers a controlling interest but held
that the "duty in every case is tied to the nature of the peculiar circumstances which
exist at the time of such a transfer." 512 F.2d at 342. The court determined that the
investigation made by the controlling persons prior to the sale of their shares was ade-
quate.
90. 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
91. Id. at 384-85 (emphasis added).
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proxy statement itself was an essential link in the transaction), his language
as to what is necessary to establish materiality has engendered conflicting
points of view. 92 Materiality is determined by reference to the reaction of a
reasonable shareholder to the information in question. But the split as to
the proper test comes in determining whether the information possibly would
have influenced the reasonable shareholder or probably would have influ-
enced the reasonable shareholder.
Judge Friendly, in Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 93 recognized the
dilemma created by the juxtaposition of the phrases "might have" and
"significant propensity" in Judge Harlan's opinion. He opined that the
"might have been" standard set too low a threshold and held that "a
standard tending toward probability rather than toward mere possibility is
more appropriate. '9 4
In Northway, Judge Swygert took the contrary view that a "possibility"
standard would further the prophylactic effect of the disclosure provisions
which were enacted to establish a full disclosure ethic. The signficant
difference, according to Judge Swygert, is that the possibility test "will not
reach 'trivial' and 'unrelated' fact; neither will it fail to reach facts which
may be relevant for some, but not for others." 95
While there is much appeal for this approach to "materiality", neverthe-
less there would appear to be an internal inconsistency in this approach since
causation flows from materiality and materiality flows from that which some
(but not necessarily all or even a signficant number) of the shareholders
may find important. Unless a substantial portion of the shareholders would
find the omitted or misstated information material, the transaction would be
approved notwithstanding the omission or misstatement. It can hardly be
said, therefore, that the omission or misstatement could be a causative factor
in the approval of the transaction.
The effect of establishing this standard in terms of possibility rather
than probability is to change, at least in many instances, the question of
materiality from one of fact to one of law. Indeed, in Northway Judge
Swygert considered the five allegedly fraudulent omissions or misstatements
and held that, as a matter of law, four violated rule 14a-9. 96 Two of the
defects dealt with the degree of control exercised by National over TSC at
the time of the proxy solicitation and two related to matters going to the
value of the stock of National which was to be issued in the transaction. As
to these, Judge Swygert held the defects material as a matter of law. The
final alleged defect dealt with the mechanics of board action at the meeting
92. See text at note 93 infra.
93. 478 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1973).
94. ld. at 1302.
95. 512 F.2d at 324.
96. Id. at 333-36.
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in which the TSC board of directors purportedly approved the transaction.
Judge Swygert held that reasonable men could differ as to the significance of
this disclosure and that the materiality of the omission accordingly could not
be properly determined on a motion for summary judgment.
SHARES IN TRUST-THE NUMBER OF HOLDERS
Tankersley v. Albright9" involved the litigation over the reorganization
of the [Chicago] Tribune Company. The part of the litigation of interest
from a securities law standpoint involved the question of whether the
company had violated the securities laws by failing to register its stock with
the SEC and generally comply with those obligations which a "report-
ing" company must fulfill under the 1934 Securities and Exchange Act. 98
This in turn raised the question of whether the company had (i) 500 or
more stock holders and (ii) $1 million in assets, as it is these two criteria
which trigger the 1934 Act registration requirement. 99 The question of
whether the Tribune Company had $1 million or more in assets obviously
was not an issue; the question of whether it had 500 or more shareholders
was. The litigation involved two trusts. One, designated as the "McCor-
mack-Patterson" trust, was a voting trust having as its corpus 53 percent of
the outstanding common stock of the Tribune Company. The other,
designated as the employees trust, contained units of beneficial interest in the
McCormack-Patterson trust.
Rule 12g5-1,100 promulgated by the SEC pursuant to section 12 of the
1934 Act, defines the concept of securities "held of record" for purposes of
determining the need to register stock under section 12 and in subparagraph
(a) (2) treats shares held of record by a trust as held by one person.
However, sub-paragraph (b) (1) provides that securities held subject to a
voting trust shall be deemed to be held of record by the record holders of the
voting trust certificates.
It was apparently conceded in the litigation that the McCormack-
Patterson trust was a voting trust and that therefore both the beneficiaries of
the trust and the shareholders of record holding the other 47 percent of the
stock would be counted in determining whether or not there were 500
shareholders of record. But since there was a two-tiered trust relationship,
in order to determine the number of beneficiaries under the McCormack-
Patterson trust it was necessary to resolve whether the employees trust
97. 514 F.2d 956 (7th Cir. 1975).
98. A reporting company, which must file periodic and other reports under section
13 of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1970), is subject to the proxy solicitation and
tender offer controls of section 14 of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1970), and subjects
its officers, directors and 10 percent shareholders to the so-called short-swing profit lia-
bility under section 16, 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1970).
99. 15 U.S.C. § 781(1)(g)(1)(B) (1970).
100. 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g5-1 (1975).
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should be considered a single holder or, alternatively, a voting trust such that
the beneficiaries of the employees trust would be deemed to be holders of
beneficial interest [securities] in the McCormack-Patterson trust and then
further imputed to be holders of record in the Tribune Company for
purposes of determining the existence, or lack thereof, of the requisite 500
holders. The situation is illustrated in Figure 2.
FIGURE 2
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The court held that the employees trust was a "formal" trust and not a
"voting" trust and that therefore it constituted one record holder. In so
holding, the court listed a series of facts which it thought indicated a formal
or ordinary trust rather than a voting trust or special agency.' 0 ' Upon
analysis, however, it is clear that the court failed to examine the essence of
the difference between a voting trust and an ordinary trust.
In a voting trust, the holder of all the incidents of ownership in a
security transfers the security to a trustee for the purpose of separating the
voting power of the security from the other incidents of ownership, with the
settlor retaining the other incidents of ownership. By statute, such a trust is
limited to ten years.10 2  The essence of the transaction is that the settlor is
101. The court stated:
Under the terms of the trust, the units so conveyed are to be treated in all
respects as a single undivided interest in the McCormick-Patterson Trust and
the original employee beneficiaries are to lose all right to call for a partition
or division of the trust corpus. Provisions in the employees' trust also prohibit
any employee beneficiary from transferring or assigning his or her interest in
the employees' trust without first successively offering this interest to Robert
R. McCormick, Joseph M. Patterson, the president of the board of directors
of the Tribune Company, the trustees of the employees' trust, and finally, all
of the employee beneficiaries. The trustees of the employees' trust are given
significant power and authority in dealing with the trust corpus. They have
express power to take any action or give any consent permitted to be taken
or given by a beneficiary of the McCormick-Patterson Trust, including actions
aimed at extending the life of the McCormick-Patterson Trust. Finally, the
employees' trust is to last for the lives of the original beneficiaries plus twenty-
one years unless earlier terminated by the unanimous vote of all beneficiaries
and Robert R. McCormick if alive, or Joseph M. Patterson, if alive.
514 F.2d at 968-69.
102. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.30a (1973), which provides as follows:
Any number of shareholders of a corporation may create a voting trust for the
purpose of conferring upon a trustee or trustees the right to vote or otherwise
represent their shares, for a period of not to exceed ten years, by entering into
a written voting trust agreement specifying the terms and conditions of the vot-
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the beneficiary and has separated legal and equitable title for the sole
purpose of giving legal title to the trustee only for voting purposes. In other
words, the essence of the transaction is that the settlor intends to lose one,
and only one, incident of ownership, namely, the right to vote. As an
aftermath of the transaction, the settlor qua beneficiary may sell or assign his
beneficial interest, which is normally explicitly made assignable, and thereby
be divorced from all interest in the security which formed the corpus of the
trust.
On the other hand, the essence of a formal trust is the creation of a new
estate in a third party, the beneficiary. In other words, the essence of the
transaction is the creation of an interest in a third party with respect to the
security; the fact that the trustee rather than the beneficiary votes the shares
is only incidental to the transaction. In point of fact, the settlor may be the
trustee of the trust, in which case it is obvious that his intention was to retain
voting power while transferring all the other incidents of ownership to the
beneficiaries of the trust. There are also situations in which the settlor is a
beneficiary of the trust but even in that case, while the trustee may be a
beneficiary of the trust and retain an interest in the subject matter of the
trust-for example a life estate-there invariably is the creation of an estate
in a third party.
In summary then, the creation of the voting trust involves the settlor of
the trust stripping himself of the right to vote but retaining the other
incidents of ownership, whereas the creation of an ordinary trust has as its
essential purpose the creation of an interest in a third party with the right to
vote incidently transferred to the trustee as record holder.
In Albright, 38 executives of the Tribune Company who were holders
of beneficial interest in the McCormack-Patterson trust stripped themselves
of all interest in the certificates of beneficial interest and transferred them in
trust so as to create a beneficial interest in the employees of the company. 10 3
Thus, the court reached the right result-that the employees trust was truely
an ordinary or formal trust and not a voting trust-but upon somewhat
imprecise reasoning.
Another way of looking at the situation would be as follows. There are
basically three interests in a corporation represented by the stock thereof:
the right to vote, the right to receive dividends (profits) and the interest in
ing trust, and by transferring their shares to such trustee or trustees for the
purposes of the agreement. Any such trust agreement shall not become ef-
fective until a counterpart of the agreement is deposited with the corporation
at its registered office. The counterpart of the voting trust agreement so de-
posited with the corporation shall be subject to the same right of examination
by a shareholder of the corporation, in person or by agent or attorney, as are
the books and records of the corporation, and shall be subject to examination
by any holder of a beneficial interest in the voting trust, either in person or
by agent or attorney, at any reasonable time for any proper purpose.
103. 514 F.2d at 968.
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the assets of the corporation upon liquidation (property).1 0 4  The essence
of the voting trust is to transfer one of these interests, the voting power, to a
trustee; the essence of the ordinary trust is to transfer the other two interests,
the right to dividends and the right to receive assets upon liquidation, to a
third party designated as the beneficiary. In the latter instance, the impetus
of the transfer of legal title to the trustee is not so much to give the right to
vote to the trustee as to provide for the management of the trust corpus by
the trustee for the benefit of the beneficiary.
RULE lOb-5
Scienter, Materiality, Reliance and Exclusivity
Three decisions of the Seventh Circuit during the past year dealt with
the issues of scienter, materiality, and reliance as requisite elements in
successfully stating and proving a cause of action under rule lOb-5. In each
of these cases, the Seventh Circuit manifested an extremely liberal position
and, in Burns v. Paddock,105 exhibited what appeared to be undue tolerance
for ineptly drawn pleadings seeking to state a cause of action under rule 10b-
5. In another case, the court held that the fact that a set of facts may give
rise to a cause of action under one of the specific liability provisions of the
securities laws does not preclude liability under rule lOb-5 as well.10 6
In Tomera v. Galt10 7 the court dealt with the question of scienter, or
the state of mind necessary to charge a person with liability under the
securities laws. Various positions obtain among the circuits and about all
that can presently be said with certainty is that excluded from the continuum
at either extreme are the possibilities of strict liability on the one hand and
specific intent to defraud on the other. Thus, the continuum for culpability
would seem to extend from negligent to knowingly but without specific
intent. In this writer's opinion, the proper test for the necessary state of
mind to establish culpability should be the "knew or should have known"
test.
Previous decisions have indicated that the Seventh Circuit is one of the
more liberal circuits on the issue of scienter and that, on the culpability
continuum, its position is much closer to strict liability than specific intent to
104. See, e.g., the definition of shares in ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.2-6 (1973).
Before it was amended in 1961, the section defined share as "the units into which the
shareholders' right to participate in the control of the corporation, in its surplus or prof-
its, or in the distribution of its assets are divided." Similarly, the Illinois Partnership
Act provides that the property rights of a partner are his rights in specific partnership
property, his interest in the partnership [profits] and his right to participate in the
management. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 106%, § 24 (1973).
105. 503 F.2d 18 (7th Cir. 1974).
106. Schaefer v. First Nat'l Bank of Lincolnwood, 509 F.2d 1287 (7th Cir. 1975).
107. 511 F.2d 504 (7th Cir. 1975).
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deceive.108 As a matter of fact, the Seventh Circuit stated three years ago,
in choosing the appropriate statute of limitations, that rule lOb-5 does not
contain the defense that one "did not know and in the exercise of reasonable
care could not have known" of the misrepresentation which is alleged to
constitute fraud under the securities laws. 109 In Tomera, Judge Sprecher
quoted this language to support his statements that "[r]ule 10b-5 claimants
need not plead nor prove scienter." 1 0  The issue of scienter, however, has
not yet received the extended, in-depth treatment necessary to establish a
categorical position by the Seventh Circuit on the issue of scienter.
The question of materiality was raised in Hidell v. International
Diversified Investments."' The promoter of the corporation and one other
investor had obtained cheap stock in the corporation (the investments were
approximately 20 cents and 5 dollars per share, respectively) and then
sought to sell an additional twenty thousand shares at $25 per share. Six
1000- share subscriptions were obtained on the condition that the remaining
shares be sold. After several months had passed, however, it was clear that
the corporation was not going to sell all twenty 1000-share subscriptions. The
promoter of the corporation then sent a letter to the six subscribers on
September 17, 1971 which stated that "we now believe that the immediate
objective of I.D.I. can be achieved with equity capital of approximately
$175,000 to $200,000"112 and that the $150,000 already provided by the
six subscribers, plus the $40,000 invested by the promoter and the other
investor, would permit I.D.I. to commence operations. The letter requested
the subscribers to consent to the elimination of the 20,000-share condition.
On September 20, 1971 the promoter travelled to Philadelphia from
Illinois and induced the plaintiffs to sign an amendment to the subscription
agreement eliminating the condition. Once again he informed them that the
company had $190,000 in capital. A few days later, on September 29, the
promoter entered into a repurchase agreement on behalf of I.D.I. with
another subscriber who would not consent to the amendment to the subscrip-
tion agreement unless the corporation agreed to repurchase his shares at his
option.
The plaintiffs argued that the failure to disclose the fact that one of the
six investors would not consent to the waiver of the 20,000-share require-
ment without a repurchase agreement by the corporation was a material fact
which should have been disclosed and, in the absence of disclosure, amount-
ed to a fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of a security. The
difficulty with the plaintiffs' position was that the repurchase agreement in
108. See Parrent v. Midwest Rug Mills, Inc., 455 F.2d 123, 127 (7th Cir. 1972).
109. Id.
110. 511 F.2d at 508.
111. 520 F.2d 529 (7th Cir. 1975).
112. Id. at 533.
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question was not executed until after they had consented to the amendment
of the subscription agreement. The Seventh Circuit, however, in a per
curiam opinion, focused on the fact that the other subscriber had requested
concessions prior to the time the promoter contacted plaintiffs in Philadel-
phia and the fact that at the time of the September 20 conversation the
promoter knew that the statement as to the $190,000 capitalization was not
a completely truthful statement of the then-current status of the corporation's
financing.
It is questionable whether the request of another subscriber for conces-
sions was a material fact which ought to have been brought to the attention
of the plaintiffs at the time of the negotiations. However, it would seem
equally clear that when a concession was in fact given to another subscriber,
this was an event of import to the other subscribers and one that ought to
have been disclosed. The evil then was not the failure to disclose the non-
material fact (the request for concession) at the time of the negotiations
leading up to the amendment of the subscription agreement but rather the
failure a few days later to disclose to the other investors that a concession
had been made to one of the subscribers.
The problem with focusing upon the later time period is that there was
no disclosure at all to the other investors at that point in time-so that there
was no misdisclosure. The question then arises as to whether there was an
affirmative obligation to disclose. Using a traditional contract approach, the
transaction with plaintiffs had been "closed" on September 20 and there
remained no further obligations to the plaintiffs arising out of that transac-
tion. Moreover, even if disclosure of the special concession given to one of
the subscribers was made at the later point, it may be argued that if the
transaction was a closed one disclosure would have served no useful purpose.
Thus, the problem is not so much one of disclosure but one of basic
fairness in dealing with all persons similarly situated by a person who, as
promoter of the enterprise, stands in a fiduciary relationship to all subscri-
bers. What the Seventh Circuit was in effect trying to accomplish by its
holding was a policy comparable to that introduced into the area of tender
offers by the 1968 amendments to the 1934 Securities Exchange Act, which
provided that when any person improves the terms of a tender offer before
its expiration by increasing the consideration offered to shareholders who
have not as yet tendered their shares, the tender-offeror shall pay the
increased consideration to each shareholder whose securities have already
been tendered, taken up and paid for by the tender offeror prior to the
increase in consideration. 113
The dilemma to be faced by a court is whether such a policy, which is
undoubtedly within the competence of the legislature to impose, can be
judicially imposed through rule 1Ob-5 by holding, for example, that the
113. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(7) (1970).
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failure to treat all subscribers alike in Hidell operated as a fraud or deceit
upon them. In other words, it seems these problems would be easier to
resolve if rule 10b-5 could be recognized as encompassing substantive
obligations of fairness and not merely procedural requisites for disclosure. 114
This is, in effect, what the SEC is attempting to do in connection with its
challenges of the recent phenomenon of "going private".", 5
Another rule 1Ob-5 case which involved the question of what constitutes
fraud under the securities laws and whether reliance had been properly
pleaded was Burns v. Paddock." 6 The bulk of the opinion dealt with the
attempt by the court to reconstruct the pleadings to avoid dismissing the
complaint. Since the opinion was bedeviled by the lack of specificity in the
pleadings, the only clear insight that evolves from the opinion is the position
that a promise made with no intention of keeping the same can constitute
fraud under the securities laws. While some state courts might yet today
question this proposition-and as a matter of fact the district court hearing
the case dismissed the count on the basis that broken promises did not
constitute securities fraud under rule lOb-5-Judge Pell quite properly
opined that a promise made with deceptive intent violates securities laws." 7
The question of the exclusivity of particular securities laws confronted
the court in Schaefer v. First National Bank of Lincolnwood.11s The
defendants contended that their conduct involved a market manipulation
scheme that was squarely within the prohibitions of section 9(a)(2) of the
1934 Act 19 and that, in effect, this explicit liability provision was the
exclusive remedy. If resort to rule lOb-5 were thereby foreclosed, plaintiffs
would have been confronted with the shorter limitation period set forth in
section 9(e). 120  The court followed one of its earlier decisions12 ' and held
that the "remedies provided by Section 10(b) as well as the other sections of
the securities acts are cumulative and not mutually exclusive".' 22
Statute of Limitations
In 1972, the Seventh Circuit held, in Parrent v. Midwest Rug Mills,
114. Cf. Popkin v. Bishop, 464 F.2d 714, 719-20 (2d Cir. 1972).
115. See Exchange Act Release No. 11231 (February 6, 1975), [1974-1975 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 80,104, 85,089-094, entitled "Notice of Public Fact-
Finding Investigation and Rule Making Proceeding in the Matter of 'Going Private'
Transactions by Public Companies or Their Affiliates."
116. 503 F.2d 18 (7th Cir. 1974).
117. Id, at 23.
118. 509 F.2d 1287 (7th Cir. 1975).
119. 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a) (2) (1970).
120. 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1970) provides as follows:
No action shall be maintained to enforce any liability created under this sec-
tion, unless brought within one year after the discovery of the facts constitut-
ing the violation and within three years after such violation.
121. Jordan Building Corp. v. Doyle, O'Connor & Co., 401 F.2d 47 (7th Cir. 1968).
122. 509 F.2d at 1292. See also SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 468
(1969).
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Inc.,' 23 that the statute of limitations to be applied to actions brought under
section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 and rule lOb-5
promulgated thereunder was to be that statute of the forum state which "best
effectuates" the policy behind those provisions of the federal securities
laws. 1 24  The Parrent court found that the civil liability provisions of the
Illinois Securities Law of 1953 resembled in scope and purpose section
10(b) of the 1934 Act and held that the controlling limitation period was
the three-year term set forth in section 13 of the -Illinois securities law,125
rather than the five-year term provided for in the general limitation statute
applicable to common law fraud actions brought in Illinois.' 26 .In looking to
the state securities laws for the applicable limitation, the decision has failed
to produce uniformity or reduce forum shopping since each state within the
circuit has blue sky laws with varying limitation periods. 1 2 7
Two recent decisions by the Seventh Circuit refined the effect of the
Parrent case. In Schaefer v. First National Bank of Lincolnwood,1 2 8 the
plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had violated the federal securities laws
by reason of varying degrees of involvement in a market manipulation
scheme involving a certain security. The claim was based on events
allegedly occurring between 1965 and 1967. These same events had, in
1967, given rise to an indictment and eventual criminal prosecution in the
Southern District of New York.' 2 9
The original complaint was filed in February of 1969. Shortly thereaft-
er, the defendants moved to have the suit dismissed in its entirety on the
grounds that it was barred by the statute of limitations. The district court
denied the motion on the ground that the applicable limitation period for
section 10(b) actions brought in the Northern District of Illinois was five
years, applying the Illinois statute of limitations for bringing common law
fraud actions.' 30  Subsequently, the criminal prosecution terminated in New
York, resulting in the conviction of all the indicated conspirators. Discovery
relative to those parties had been suspended pending termination of the
criminal action. When discovery was completed, a second amended com-
plaint was filed in the fall of 1972, naming the American Stock Exchange
and several of its specialists as party defendants.' 3' All of the newly added
parties and one of the parties named in the original complaint 3 2 immediate-
123. 453 F.2d 123 (7th Cir. 1972).
124. Id. at 126-127.
125. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1211, § 137.13(d) (1973).
126. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 83, § 16 (1973).
127. See Horwich and Ruder, note 1 supra, at 404-05 nn. 260, 280.
128. 509 F.2d 1287 (7th Cir. 1975).
129. Id. at 1290-91.
130. The district court's opinion was prior to the decision in Parrent.
131. 509 F.2d at 1291.
132. The original defendant who moved for dismissal was Rodman & Renshaw. Id.
at 1290.
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ly moved for dismissal on the basis that the recently decided Parrent case
clearly established that the plaintiffs' case was barred by the statute of
limitations set forth in the Illinois securities law and the district court
dismissed all counts against these defendants.
The main thrust of that part of the opinion dealing with the statute of
limitations issue dealt with the impact of the three year limit upon ,Rodman
& Renshaw, a brokerage house named in the original complaint. One of its
employees had participated in the planning of the scheme but left its employ
in late 1965 before the scheme ran its course. The liability of Rodman &
Renshaw was predicated upon its failure to supervise this employee and it
argued that the statute should begin to run from the time he left its employ
since it could not thereafter be responsible for the cover-up of the fraudulent
scheme.
The court first held that, notwithstanding the "look" to state law for the
applicable limitation period, the running of the statute may be tolled by the
tolling doctrine adopted by the federal courts in fraud actions, where the
fraud has been actively concealed or is of a nature to conceal itself, until the
plaintiff has obtained knowledge or, in the exercise of due care, should have
obtained knowledge of the fraud. 1 33
It then held that the tolling doctrine operates both against those who
commit the fraudulent acts and those who by their negligence facilitate the
fraud. Since plaintiffs did not learn of the fraudulent scheme until the
criminal indictment in 1967, and since the scheme was concealed by those
actively pursuing it, the complaint filed in 1969 was within the statute as
tolled. In so doing, the court continued and extended the trend developed in
Hochfelder v. Midwest Stock Exchange.13 4  However, with respect to
AMEX and its specialists, who were added in 1972, more than three years
after the criminal indictment, the court held that plaintiffs had not exercised
due diligence, because the 1967 indictment put them on notice of the
possibility of involvement by AMEX and discovery could have been had of
the brokerage houses since the discovery was stayed only as to the indicted
conspirators. 135
In Tomera v. Galt,'36 the court again looked to the reason why
discovery of the fraud might be delayed and distinguished between fraud
which goes undiscovered after its commission even though the defendant
does nothing to conceal it and fraud which, after its commission, is actively
concealed by the defendant. As to the former, it followed the prior
decisions of the Seventh Circuit 13 7 requiring plaintiffs to exercise due
133. Id. at 1296, citing Judge Swygert's opinion in Hochfelder v. Midwest Stock Ex-
change, 503 F.2d 364, 375 (7th Cir. 1974).
134. 503 F.2d 364 (7th Cir. 1974).
135. 509 F.2d at 1299.
136. 511 F.2d 504 (7th Cir. 1975).
137. E.g., Morgan v. Koch, 419 F.2d 993 (7th Cir. 1969).
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diligence in discovering the fraud. However, as to fraud which is actively
concealed by the defendant, it held that the statute is tolled until actual
discovery is made by the plaintiff.
'In Tomera, the court looked to the activity of another plaintiff in
seeking information and being rebuffed in every instance by defendants; it
then concluded that "[w]hether plaintiff personally inquired into the busi-
ness affairs of the two Mexican corporations is unimportant. ' 13 8  In effect,
Ms. Tomera was the "third party beneficiary" of another plaintiff's exercise
of due diligence in seeking to ferret out the fraud.
As an abstract proposition, the notion that any active concealment of
fraud after the commission thereof automatically tolls the statute indefinitely
appears to be too open-ended. A basic policy underlying statutes of
limitation is to have claims litigated before the evidence is lost or the
recollections of witnesses dimmed through lapse of time.'3 9 Carried to the
extreme, Tomera would keep claims open forever. However, as limited to
its facts, it is a reasonable approach. There will normally be no "after the
fact" cover-up unless one plaintiff, in effect, exercises due diligence. Since
this plaintiff will be in court, there appears to be no strong policy argument
why the defendant should be able to escape liability vis-a-vis a less
aggressive or diligent plaintiff.
ATTORNEYS' FEES
Attorneys' fees in litigation are not ordinarily recoverable unless provid-
ed for by statute or by an enforceable contract. 140 However, the courts,
drawing on their historic equity powers,' 4 1 have developed several excep-
tions to this general rule. For example, a successful party to a lawsuit may
be awarded attorneys' fees if the losing party has acted in bad faith or
vexatiously. '
42
Another judicially created exception permits an award of attorneys' fees
to a plaintiff whose successful suit has benefited others not parties to the
action. This exception was first recognized in cases where a plaintiff's
success created a fund for the benefit of an entire group 43 and was later
extended in Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.'4 4 to a situation in a sharehold-
ers' derivative suit where no actual fund was created. The theory of this
138. 511 F.2d at 510.
139. See generally 51 AM. JuR. 2d Limitation of Actions §§ 17-18 (1970).
140. Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714 (1967).
141. See Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 392-93 (1970); Angoff v.
Goldfine, 270 F.2d 185, 186 (5th Cir. 1959); Note, Allocation of Attorneys Fees After
Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 316, 319 (1971).
142. F.D. Rich Co. v. United States ex rel. Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116,
129 (1974).
143. Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527, 532 (1882).
144. 396 U.S. 375, 392-96 (1970).
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approach was that if the plaintiff in the shareholder's derivative suit enforces
a right for the benefit of the corporation, thereby benefiting all shareholders,
it is proper that all shareholders bear the cost of bringing the action. When
the corporate defendant is ordered to pay the attorneys' fees and other costs,
the basis of the order is not the corporation's position as defendant but rather
that this is the most efficient way to allocate costs among the benefited
shareholders.145
In Mills,' 46 the Supreme Court did not reach the question as to
whether plaintiffs, having recovered attorneys' fees for establishing the
existence of a violation of the securities laws, could recover additional fees
for litigating the question of relief. 147 It was to this latter issue that Judge
Tone first addressed himself in Swanson v. American Consumer Industries,
Inc.148  He held, quite logically, that if the expense of establishing the
existence of a cause of action benefits the corporation and its shareholders,
then the cost of litigation "establishing the, effects of the violation" (the
damages under the cause of action) must similarly benefit them. 149  The
defendants had argued that, since some members of the class had opted out
of the litigation, they should be exempted from sharing the burden of the
fees. This argument was rejected by the court on the ground that the basis
for the suit was a derivative one. Since the corporation was benefited by
establishing the violation of the securities laws, it must assume the cost on
behalf of its shareholders.
The problem with this line of reasoning is that the suit was originally
brought derivatively and as a class action. In Swanson 11,' 50 the court in
essence granted "class action" and not "derivative" relief. It acknowledged
that the misleading proxy statement may have induced some shareholders to
approve the sale, thereby resulting in a loss of their rights as dissenters or
appraisers. Accordingly, it held that "the appropriate remedy is to restore to
the plaintiff shareholders the opportunity to receive cash rather than ACI
145. 396 U.S. at 392, 396-97.
146. As the court in Swanson v. American Consumer Indus., Inc., 517 F.2d 555
(7th Cir. 1975), stated:
In Mills, an extension of Trustees v. Greenough, supra, the rationale for award-
ing fees was that the expense of prosecuting the action should be borne by
those who benefited by the judgment. This was accomplished by having the
corporation pay the fees, since all its shareholders thereby bore the cost equally
with the benefit. This distribution of costs is "between solicitor and client,"
in terms of Trustees v. Greenough and not between the adverse parties
to the case. It is in their role as former shareholders and as the succes-
sor corporations of the nominal defendant Peoria that ACI and U.S. Cold
may have a portion of the attorneys' fees imposed upon them, not in their other
role as defendants in this litigation.
Id. at 560 (citation omitted).
147. 396 U.S. at 390 n. 13.
148. 517 F.2d 555 (7th Cir. 1975) ,[hereinafter referred to as Swanson III].
149. Id. at 562.
150. 475 F.2d 516 (7th Cir. 1973).
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shares."'151 The significance of this holding will become more apparent as
the question of the amount of the fee is analyzed.
The district court allowed attorneys' fees in the amount of $21,336,
together with full payment of expenses, but refused to permit recovery for
time spent on issues upon which plaintiffs did not prevail. The appealing
attorneys sought $89,377. Judge Tone held in Swanson III that it was error
to exclude recovery for services in connection with issues upon which
plaintiffs did not prevail although the failure to prevail upon certain issues
could be taken into account, as could the modesty of the relief ultimately
awarded plaintiffs and the amount "that could realistically have been hoped
to be recoverable.l 1 52
In reviewing the numbers, the court set forth $25,956 as the amount
recovered by the shareholders who pursued the litigation, $16,200 as the
amount that could have been recovered by the shareholders who opted out
and an additional $25,000 as the amount that could have been recovered if
the valuation set forth by plaintiffs' expert witness had been accepted. 153
The court then concluded that $40,000 was an appropriate fee.15 4
The facts of this case present a dilemma in commenting upon the
appropriateness of the attorneys' fee award. The Mills case authorized the
payment of fees where "corporate therapeutics" that provide "a benefit to all
shareholders" are involved.' 55 But in Swanson, the majority shareholder,
controlling 87 percent of the stock, was the culprit. The litigation certainly
conferred no benefit upon it. Thus, only minority shareholders were
benefited and only to the extent of $42,156. An attorneys' fee award of
$40,000 appears out of proportion. On the other hand, a lesser award
might discourage this type of litigation and this in turn would lead to the
creation of the syndrome that the greater the control, the more the majority
151. Id. at 521.
152. 517 F.2d at 563. For recitation of factors used in determining attorneys' fees,
see Schlesinger v. Wallace, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,098 (N.D. Ala. 1973), and 3B
J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACrICE 23.1.25 at 23.1-453 (2d ed. 1974):
[These factors] include the amount recovered for the corporation; the time
fairly required to be spent on the case; the skill required and employed on the
case considering the intricacy, novelty and complexity of the issues; the diffi-
culty encountered in unearthing the facts; the skill and resourcefulness of op-
posing counsel; the prevailing rate of compensation for those with the skill, ex-
perience and standing of the attorneys, accountants or others involved; the ben-
efits accruing to the public; and the contingent nature of the fees.
Another recent Seventh Circuit securities case, Hidell v. International Diversified Inv.,
520 F.2d 529 (7th Cir. 1975), involved the effect of a contingent fee agreement on an
award of attorneys' fees for a violation of the Illinois Securities Act, ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 121, §§ 137.1 et seq. (1973). The circuit court, citing Gowdey v. Richter, 20 Ill.
App. 3d 514, 530, 314 N.E.2d 549, 561 (1974), rejected defendants' suggestion that a
contingent fee agreement precludes an award of attorneys fees.
153. 517 F.2d at 563.
154. Id. at 564.
155. 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
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can take advantage of the minority because the amount recoverable by the
minority would not justify an attorneys' fee sufficient to induce the undertak-
ing of the litigation. As it was, doubling the attorneys' fee apparently
produced compensation at a rather modest hourly rate.' 6 Thus Judge
Tone may have been implicitly weighing the need for therapeutic litigation
much more heavily than the modesty of the sums in dispute.
PROCEDURE
In SEC v. Savage,'57 the Seventh Circuit was faced with an appeal
from an order of the district court requiring compliance with a subpoena
duces tecum issued by the SEC. The respondents were engaged in the
commodity futures business and were being investigated by the SEC to
determine whether they had violated either the registration or anti-fraud
provisions of the federal securities laws. The respondents resisted the
subpoena on the basis that the SEC must first establish its jurisdiction by
demonstrating that the commodity futures contracts are securities within the
meaning of the securities laws. In a per curiam opinion affirming the order
of the district court requiring compliance with the subpoena, the court
pointed out that part of the purpose of the investigation was to determine
whether or not the respondents' course of business did in fact involve a
security. As the court stated, "the appellants [respondents] would require
SEC to answer at the outset of its investigation the possibly doubtful
questions of fact and law that the investigation is designed and authorized to
illuminate."' 5  The Seventh Circuit followed the reasoning of the United
States Supreme Court in Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling,159
where the court analogized an administrative agency's investigatory function
to the action of the grand jury and held that such inquiry is not to be limited
by forecasts of the probable results of the investigation. The Second Circuit,
in two recently decided opinions involving the investigatory power of the
Securities and Exchange Commission, has likewise refused to limit the SEC's
authority. 160
In King v. Kansas City Southern Industries, Inc.,' ° ' the Seventh Circuit
had under consideration an appeal by plaintiffs from the order of the district
court denying them class action status and approving a proposed settlement
156. According to the Reply Brief for Appellant at 18, Swanson v. American Con-
sumer Industries, Inc., No. 74-1430 (7th Cir. 1975), the district court's award would
have compensated plaintiff's attorneys at a rate equal to $12.50 per hour.
157. 513 F.2d 188 (7th Cir. 1975).
158. Id. at 189.
159. 327 U.S. 186 (1946).
160. SEC v. Brigadoon Scotch Distributors, Ltd., 480 F.2d 1047 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 915 (1973); SEC v. Wall Street Transcript Corp., 422 F.2d 1371 (2d
Cir. 1970).
161. 519 F.2d 20 (7th Cir. 1975).
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agreement. The litigation arose out of a Rosenfeld v. Black162 type situation
in which shareholders of a mutual fund were deceived through a misleading
proxy statement into approving, in effect, the sale of the mutual fund ad-
visor at a profit.
Class action, derivative and direct actions were brought and the district
court denied class action status to the Kings as shareholders of the fund,
stayed the derivative actions and let the direct action proceed with opportu-
nity for shareholders of the fund to intervene to insure an adversary
proceeding. Judge Sprecher held that this was a practical decision to be left
to the discretion of the lower court and affirmed. He further held that the
Kings were estopped from challenging the settlement since they had agreed
to the amount and were challenging only the question of the proper
beneficiary.
McGough v. First Arlington National Bank' 63 involved a rather con-
fused situation involving the purchase of a car-wash by plaintiff, the financing
of it by defendant, the lease of the car-wash back to the seller and the
sublease by the seller to an operator. The venture collapsed and the
plaintiff was sued by defendant in state court on the note, whereupon he
sued in federal court seeking recission on the basis that the transaction
involved a security and that the securities laws were violated in connection
with the sale thereof. The district court refused to restrain the state court
action and stayed the district court proceeding.16 4  The Seventh Circuit
affirmed the refusal to restrain the state court proceeding but reversed the
stay of the district court proceeding, commenting: "We deem it regrettable
that these two proceedings should be progressing on separate courses, each
racing to a conclusion before the other, which in their respective postures can
be satisfactorily resolved to no one."'165
'It cannot be gainsaid that it is undesirable for both actions to proceed.
Accordingly, if, as the Seventh Circuit has held,' 66 a securities claim can be
asserted as a defense in a state court proceeding even though it could not
have been initiated there because of the exclusive jurisdiction conferred upon
federal courts,' 67 it did not make sense to reverse the stay of the district
court action.
CONCLUSION
As indicated at the beginning of this article, during the past term the
United States Supreme Court has explicitly or implicitly overruled two earlier
162. 445 F.2d 1337 (2d Cir. 1971).
163. 519 F.2d 552 (7th Cir. 1975).
164. Id. at 554.
165. Id. at 555.
166. Aetna State Bank v. Altheimer, 430 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1970).
167. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1970) provides that the "district courts ...shall have ex-
clusive jurisdiction of violations of this title or the rules and regulations thereunder."
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decisions of the Seventh Circuit. 'In the opinion of this author, the Seventh
Circuit's treatment of the Birnbaum and Schedule 13D problems in Eason
and Mosinee Paper, respectively, represented clearer judicial insight into the
purposes of the federal securities laws, and the appropriate implementation
thereof, than did the Supreme Court's decisions in Blue Chip Stamps and
Mosinee Paper. 'With respect to the decisions of the Seventh Circuit itself
this past year, neither the problems which arose nor the judicial treatment
thereof were particularly unique. While there were areas treated in the
Seventh Circuit for the first time, the overall effect of its work this past year
has been to add breadth more than depth to the body of law in the securities
field. In so doing, however, the Seventh Circuit has continued to manifest
an appreciation for the underlying purposes of the securities laws and a
sophistication in dealing straight-forwardly with the complex problems in this
area.
